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Abstract
Payments for environmental services (PES) are based on the beneficiary-pays rather than
the polluter-pays principle. In this paper we argue that this is a key factor for identifying
what ecosystems are amenable to PES. We build a general equilibrium framework to identify
what ecosystems are amenable to PES as an efficient solution. In economies where society
has a higher degree of environmental responsibility and produces a low level of alternative
land services income efficient transfers cannot be financed with voluntary payments. There-
fore PES programs must be seen as environmental subsidies (to ES providers) and must be
combined with a user fee (on ES users). We use Costa Rica’s Payments for Environmental
Services program (PSA) to illustrate our findings. We find that the efficient payments for
forest conservation are higher than the value reported by Pagiola (2008). Implementing an
efficient system implies an increase in payments for forest conservation by 4.15-fold.
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1 Introduction
Payments for environmental services (PES) have been broadly used to make conservation a
more attractive option for ecosystem managers. Are PES programs an attempt to put the
Coase theorem into practice? Answering this question is crucial in identifying what ecosys-
tems are amenable to PES programs: Engel et al. (2008) and Tacconi (2012). The consensus
appears to be that voluntary participation is the key element for identifying efficient PES
programs. PES programs where buyers are the users of the ES are more likely to be efficient
than those where a third party, e.g. the government, acts on behalf of ES users.
Unlike other instruments –which can be applied to overcome problems of external effects–
PES is based on the beneficiary-pays rather than the polluter-pays principle. In this paper
we argue that this is a key factor for identifying what ecosystems are amenable to PES.
In a general equilibrium framework, we consider an economy where an ecosystem –a natural
capital- can be exploited to produce land services. We prove that efficient conservation can
be obtained when a complete number of competitive markets can be designed. The key
market is the conservation market where ecosystem services are traded at positive prices.
We show that the efficient level of conservation depends on the degree of environmental
responsibility of siciety. When society has a higher degree of environmental responsibility
more ecosystems are saved for the future, thus increasing the size of the ecosystem allocated
to provide ES. More productive economies, which are able to produce the same amount of
land services by exploiting a smaller proportion of the ecosystem, also increase the size of
the ecosystem allocated to provide ES.
In this general equilibrium framework we identify what ecosystems are amenable to PES
as an efficient solution. In less productive economies PES programs always implement effi-
cient allocations. However, in highly productive economies the efficient allocations for PES
programs cannot be always implemented. In economies where society has a higher degree
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of environmental responsibility and produces a low level of alternative land service income
efficient transfers cannot be financed with voluntary payments. Therefore PES programs
that implement efficient allocations must be designed by a government . Payments must be
seen as environmental subsidies (to ES providers) and must be combined with a user fee (on
ES users).
We use the Costa Rica’s Payments for Environmental Services program (PSA) to illustrate
our findings. Using data from pollination experiments at Finca Santa Rita conducted by
Ricketts et al. (2004), we calibrate the model to match the fraction of total biomass forestry
allocated to forest conservation uses. We find that the efficient payments for forest con-
servation are higher than the value reported by Pagiola (2008). Implementing an efficient
payment implies an increase in payments for forest conservation by 4.15-fold.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model and characterizes
the Pareto efficient allocation and the competitive equilibrium with a complete number of
markets. Section 3 establishes conditions for the existence of Coasian PES programs. Section
4 illustrates the model. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
Consider the illustration in Pagiola and Platais (2007) of the logic of payments for environ-
mental services. Land ecosystem managers benefit from uses such as, for example, forest
conservation. These benefits are normally lower than the benefits they would receive from
alternative land uses, such as conversion to cropland or pasture. However deforestation de-
rived from these alternative uses affects the global community because of the loss of water
services, biodiversity, carbon sequestration, etc. The idea of a PES is to internalize these
negative effects by making forest conservation more attractive to ecosystem managers.
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We formalize this logic by considering an economy where an ecosystem, Xt, can be exploited
to produce alternative land services. This production of land services is denoted as ht.
Assume that the ecosystem dynamics are given by Xt+1 = AX
α
t − ht where AXαt is the
natural gross growth of the ecosystem with α ∈ (0, 1) representing the growth elasticity and
A > 0 the total factor productivity.
Land services are produced with a technology that uses labor, lt, and the ecosystem as
inputs, that is ht = AX
α
t lt. Under these assumptions (1− lt) represents the fraction of total
biomass forestry, AXαt , that is allocated to provide environmental services.
Beneficiaries of environmental services (ES) have (additively separable) preferences over the
land services, ht and the fraction of the total ecosystem allocated to conservation uses, (1−lt).
We assume that the utility function is given by
u(ht, 1− lt) = log ht + e log(1− lt),
where e represents the degree of environmental responsibility of consumers.
In this economy the (Pareto) efficient level of conservation, (1− l)∗, is chosen such that the
marginal rate of substitution between present and future consumption is equal to the net
marginal product of the natural ecosystem. Lemma 1 characterizes this.
Lemma 1. The optimal level of ecosystem conservation is given by (1−l)∗ = αβ + e(1− αβ)
1 + e(1− αβ)
with ∂(1− l)∗ \ ∂α > 0, ∂(1− l)∗ \ ∂β > 0 and ∂(1− l)∗ \ ∂e > 0.
Proof See Appendix A.1.
Notice that the efficient level of conservation depends positively on the parameters e, α and
β. These results are quite intuitive. When society has a higher degree of environmental
responsibility (higher e), or cares more about the future (higher β), it saves more for the
future. More productive economies (higher α) are able to produce the same amount of land
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services with less ecosystem services, thus increasing savings for the future and increasing
the size of the ecosystem allocated to provide ES.
If a whole number of competitive markets can be designed, Pareto-efficient allocation can
be implemented as a competitive equilibrium. The key market is the conservation market
where the ecosystem is traded. This market works in the following way: Divide each period
(of 1 day) into two subperiods (morning and evening). Each morning, firms that produces
land services can buy the ecosystem at a price rt. The market is competitive and nobody
can be excluded. In the evening consumers redeem the ecosystem, paying qt per unit of the
ecosystem not exploited.
In this economy, ecosystem managers receive benefits from the alternative land uses, ht,
and from ecosystem conservation Xt+1 = AX
α
t − ht, the ecosystem services (ES). Therefore
they introduce into their calculations the fact that their income does not come solely from
the sale of their land services, ht, but that they can also sell that part of the ecosystem
in the conservation market. Thus, in each period they pay rtXt for the right to access
the ecosystem, hire lt units of labor at a wage of wt and decide how much to extract, ht,
considering that they can sell the ecosystem, Xt+1 on the conservation market at price qt.
That is, the ecosystem is exploited by solving the following problem:
max
{ht,lt}
ht + qt (AX
α
t − ht)− wtlt − rtXt,
s.t.
 ht = AX
α
t lt,
ht, Xt+1, lt, Xt ≥ 0.
(1)
From the first order conditions of this problem, the prices of the factors can be written as
follows:
wt = (1− qt)AXαt , (2)
rt = αAX
α−1
t [(1− qt)lt + qt]. (3)
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As usual, conditions (2) and (3) indicate that potential ES providers exploit the ecosystem
until their marginal products equal their factor price (the opportunity cost of conservation).
Producing one more unit of alternative land uses, ht, will reduce the ecosystem, and therefore
the income that can be obtained in the conservation market.
In this Coasian economy, the buyers of ES are also the owners of the ecosystem. Therefore,
they receive rtXt, in the morning for the ecosystem and pay qtXt+1 in the evening to reedem
it. Formally the budget constraint is ht + qtXt+1 = wtlt + rtXt. Therefore, buyers of the ES
invest in the future of the ecosystem by solving the following problem:
max
{ht,lst ,Xt+1}∞t=1
∑∞
t=0 β
t [log ht + e log(1− lt)] ,
s.t.

ht + qtXt+1 = wtlt + rtXt,
Xt+1 = AX
α
t − ht,
ht, lt, Xt+1 ≥ 0,
X0 is given.
(4)
A competitive equilibrium in this economy is given by an allocation that solves the opti-
mization problems (1) and (4), and markets clear. Lemma 2 shows that the competitive
equilibrium implements thethe Pareto-efficient allocation, i.e. Coase’s theorem applies.
Lemma 2. The competitive equilibrium associated with the existence of conservation markets
is efficient. Moreover, the conservation price qt is
qt =
αlt
1− α (1− lt) =
α (1− αβ)
1− α2β + e(1− αβ) (1− α) > 0.
Proof See Appendix A.2.
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3 Coasian PES programs
Wunder (2005), defines a PES program as a ‘voluntary transaction where a well-defined
environmental service (or a ecosystem use likely to secure that service) is being ‘bought’ by
a service buyer from a service provider, if and only if, the service provider secures service
provision (conditionality)’. Therefore, consider that a government designs a PES program
to implement a Coasian allocation, Xt+1. The total payments for ecosystem services (PES)
that induce ecosystem managers to ensure the conservation of the efficient level of ecosystem,
Xt+1, are T (Xt+1) = qtXt+1. Ecosystem managers also receive a (potential) positive payment
from the sale of their land services, P (ht). Therefore, in our general equilibrium framework
consumers pay P (ht) to the ecosystem managers and a transfer v to the government. Figure
1 illustrates the transactions in PES programs.
Coasian PES programs can be implemented if there is a positive payment, P (ht), and a
positive voluntary transaction, T (Xt+1) that satisfies the ES buyers’ budget constraint
P (ht) + T (Xt+1) = wtlt,
where T (Xt+1) = qtXt+1 and P (ht) = ht
[
1− qt
lt
]
.1
Lemma 2 shows that the conservation price, qt, is positive. Therefore, voluntary transfers
are always positive. The Proposition below characterizes the P (ht) associated with EPS
Programs.
1Note that from equation (3), ht − rtXt = ht − ht
lt
[α(1 − qt)lt + αqt]. Given that from Lemma 2
α(1− qt)lt = q(1− α) ) it holds that P (ht) = ht
[
1− qtlt
]
.
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T (Xt+1) = qXt+1 > 0 payment environmental services
Net Payments
P (ht) = ht[1− qt
lt
] > 0
Voluntary contribution
T (Xt+1) = qXt+1 > 0
Firms Government
Figure 1: PES program. The government pays ecosystem managers to induce them to ensure
the conservation of the efficient level of the ecosystem, Xt+1. Total payments for ecosystem
services (PES) are T (Xt+1). Payment from the sale of their land services is P (ht).
Proposition 1. P (ht) is given by
P (ht) = ht
1− 11− α2β + e(1− αβ) (1− α)
α + eα(1− αβ)
 .
Proof See Appendix A.3.
Note that P (ht), given by Proposition 1 depends on the degree of environmental responsibil-
ity, e. An increase in willingness to pay for environment conservation increases the fraction of
the resource allocated to conservation uses (∂(1− l)/∂e > 0) and they save more ecosystems
for the future (∂Xt+1/∂e > 0). Therefore a higher degree of environmental responsibility in-
creases transfers (higher T ) and reduces the income obtained from harvesting, wtlt. Thus, in
order to satisfy the consumer budget constraint, P (ht) must be lower. Proposition 2 shows
that there is a maximum level of environmental responsibility, e , such that P (ht) = 0.
For higher levels of environmental responsibility, e > e, the implementation of the Coasian
equilibrium implies a negative P (ht) (see Figure 2).
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Figure 2: PES program in societies with high degree of environmental responsibility (e > e).
Consumers receive a payment, P (ht), from the conumption of land services, ht.
Proposition 2. Let α > 1/2. If e > e =
1− α(1 + αβ)
(2α− 1)(1− αβ) , P (ht) < 0.
Proof See Appendix A.3.
Proposition 2 bounds the degree of environmental responsibility that sustains Coasian PES
programs. These constraints on preferences and productivity can be rewritten in a more
suitable way. The size of voluntary transfers (as a fraction of total income),
T
wl
, is given by
T
wl
=
(
α
1− α
)
[
1 +
(
h
X
)] = ( α
1− α
)
(1− l). (5)
Equation (5) represents the set of all Coasian allocations. Any allocation l ∈ (0, 1), associated
with conservation prices q, that generates a transfer T = qXt+1 can be implemented by
generating a complete number of competitive markets. However, P (ht) = 0 when l =
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Coasian
Taxes
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Figure 3: The horizontal axis represents the fraction of total biomass forestry, l, allocated to
produce the alternative land services (pasture or conversion to cropland); the vertical axis
represents the size of voluntary transfers (as a fraction of total income). The curve represents
the set of Coasian allocations. PES programs implement Coasian allocations if l ≥ le=e. In
societies with a high degree of environmental responsibility (e higher than e), voluntary
transfers cannot implement Coasian allocations (where l < le=e) and PES programs must be
based on taxes.
2 − 1/α.2 That is, the maximum degree of environmental responsibility compatible with
Coasian PES programs, e, generates le=e = 2 − 1α . In societies with a higher degree of
environmental responsibility (e higher than e), where l < le=e PES programs cannot be
based on voluntary transfers.
The implementation of the Coasian equilibrium with PES programs depends on the ecosys-
tem productivity, α. PES programs are based on (conditional) transfers to ecosystem man-
agers. Those transfers are voluntary if consumers receive the return on their investments
(the voluntary transfer). The capital income -associated with a level of conservation, Xt,
2Note that
1− qt
lt
= 1− α
1− α (1− lt) =
1 + αl − 2α
1 + αl − α = 0⇒ l = 2−
1
α
.
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per unit of ht is equal to
rtXt+1
ht
=
qt
lt
=
α
1− α(1− lt) .
Note that in low productive economies α < 1
2
) this capital income is always lower than the
alternative land service payments(i.e. rtXt+1
ht
≤ 1). However, in high productive economies
(α > 1
2
) capital income is higher than the alternative land service payments (i.e. rtXt+1
ht
> 1)
when e > e. In that case the alternative land service payments are not able to generate the
necessary income to implement PES programs based on voluntary transfers.
4 A numerical illustration: The Costa Rica’s PES
PES schemes have been successfully implemented in Mexico, Mun˜oz-Pin˜a et al. (2003), and
Mun˜oz-Pin˜a et al. (2008), Nicaragua, Pagiola et al. (2007) and Costa Rica Pagiola (2008).3
We use the Costa Rica’s Payments for Environmental Services program (PSA) to illustrate
our findings.
In order to calculate the competitive equilibrium associated with a complete number of
markest (Coase allocations) we need to calibrate four parameters, e, α, β and A. We set the
discount factor, β = 1
1+r
, at 0.8649 to match the (average) interes rate in Costa Rica from
2000 to2003.4 TFP parameter, A, is normalized equal to 1.
Environmental responsibility e, and the elasticity of the resource α are calibrated to match
the fraction of total biomass forestry allocated to forest conservation uses, (1 − lt) and the
impact of the Costa Rica’s forest on harvesting income reported by Ricketts et al. (2004).
In 2002-2003, Ricketts et al. (2004) conducted pollination experiments at Finca Santa Fe, a
3For a survey of payments for environmental services programs in developed and developing countries,
see Wunder et al. (2008)
4We use real interest rates reported by the World Bank. The real interest rate is the lending interest
rate adjusted for inflation as measured by the GDP deflator. In 2000-2003 it was 16.7%, 14.0%, 15.8% and
16.0%. Setting r = 15.62%, the mean value over the period, yields β = 0.8649.
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Table 1: PSA (Costa Rica) Calibration
target Parameter
Discount Factor Real interest rate 15.62 % β 0.8649
Environmental responsibility % of Forestry Land 54.56 % e 0.2829
Priv. elasticity of the resource Finca Santa Fe’s ∆ Income 7.00 % α 0.5533
1,065 ha coffee farm in Valle General (Costa Rica), to estimate the economic value of forest
conservation on coffee farms. They found that pollination services from two forest fragments
increased total coffee farm income by 7%. Formally, if the stationary production of ‘coffee’
is h = (1− l) α1−α l then
dh/dl
h
= −
(
α
1− α
)(
1
1− l
)
+
1
l
= −0.07. (6)
Bertsch (2004) reports Land uses in Costa Rica. In 2001, forestry represented 54.56% of
total land resources.5 Therefore
1− l = αβ + e(1− αβ)
1 + e(1− αβ) = 0.5456. (7)
Equations (6) and (7) yield α = 0.5533 and e is equal to 0.2829 (see Table 1). Once the
model is calibrated, we solve for the stationary equilibrium (See Appendix A.5.)
We divide the quantitative experiments into two parts. (1) We study the impact of the
degree of environmental responsibility on prices and allocations in the economy by comparing
statistics for the economy with e = e relative to the benchmark economy. (2) We study the
contribution of the resource productivity on the existence of Coasian PES programs by
comparing the predictions of the model to three versions of the model where α is lower than
the calibrated value.
5See, ‘Cuadro 1’, on pag 138.
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Table 2: PSA (Costa Rica) Accounting
Data Benchmark Economy
∆ Coffe income per ha Ricketts et al. (2004) USD 128.57 P (h) USD 128.57
Forestry / Land Bertsch (2004) 54.56 % (1− l) 54.56 %
Payments for conservation Average 2003 per ha USD 64.62 T USD 267.98
ratio over Coffee income 50.26 % T/P (h) 208.43 %
The first column of Table 3 reports the stationary equilibrium associated with the calibrated
values (the benchmark economy). Column two reports the equilibrium associated with the
maximum level of environmental responsibility, e, compatible with Coasian PES programs.
Table 3 shows that T/P (h) in the benchmark economy is 208.43 %. Ricketts et al. (2004)
provide data for calculating T/P (h) in Costa Rica. Coffee productivity per ha (in areas
affected by pollinization) increased 3.75 fanegas per ha times USD 34.75 per fanega, yielding
USD 128.575 per ha. Pagiola (2008) reports that in 2006 annual payments for forest conser-
vation, T , averaged USD 64/hectare (ha). Therefore, the voluntary contributions over coffee
income ratio, T/P (h) is 50.26 % (see Table 2). This is lower than the value obtained in the
model.
Therefore, we recalibrate α to match the T/P (h) ratio. Column four of Table 3 reports the
recalibrated economy, with α = 0.4206, and columns five and six report economies without
environmental responsibility (e = 0) and with a high level of environmental responsibility
(e = 100, implies 1− l ' 1).
Table 3 shows that societies with a higher degree of environmental responsibility (higher
e) allocate a higher fraction of total biomass forestry to providing environmental services
(higher1− l) by reducing the production of alternative land services (lover ht) and increasing
the savings of ecosystems for the future (higher X). Prices associated with the competitive
equilibrium, q, r and w are well defined in all the economies. Societies with a high degree of
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Table 3: PSA (Costa Rica) Coasian Economies
Calibration Low productive
Baseline e High e Baseline Low e High e
Parameters
e 0.2829 3.2727 100.00 0.2829 0.0000 100.00
α 0.5533 0.5533 0.5533 0.4206 0.4206 0.4206
β 0.8649 0.8649 0.8649 0.8649 0.8649 0.8649
A 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
Equilibrium
1− l 0.5456 0.8073 0.9902 0.4608 0.3638 0.9902
l 0.4544 0.1927 0.0098 0.5392 0.6362 0.0098
X 0.2576 0.6193 0.9782 0.2626 0.1746 0.9831
h 0.2145 0.1478 0.0097 0.3072 0.3054 0.0098
w 0.3021 0.6193 0.9760 0.4095 0.3283 0.9858
r 0.6601 0.2386 0.0121 0.6104 0.8685 0,0072
q 0.3601 0.1927 0.0120 0.2813 0.3159 0.0071
Budget Constraint
rX 0.1700 0.1478 0.0119 0.1603 0.1516 0.0070
wl 0.1373 0.1193 0.0096 0.2208 0.2089 0.0097
Income 0.3073 0.2671 0.0214 0.3811 0.3605 0.0168
h 0.2145 0.1478 0.0097 0.3072 0.3054 0.0098
qX 0.0928 0.1193 0.0117 0.0739 0.0552 0.0070
Expenditures 0.3073 0.2671 0.0214 0.3811 0.3605 0.0168
environmental responsibility (e = 100) allocate the same fraction of total biomass forestry
to providing environmental services (1− l = 99%). Prices (w, r and q) reflect differences in
productivity (in α) between those economies.
Table 4 reports the PES programs that implement the allocations reported in Table 3. Note
that when α is high, and e > e, PES that induces ecosystem managers to provide the efficient
provision of the ES, Xt+1, cannot be based on voluntary transfers given that T/wl is greater
than 1.
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Table 4: PSA (Costa Rica) PES programs
Calibration Low productive
Baseline e High e Baseline Low e High e
Parameters
e 0.2829 3.2727 100.00 0.2829 0.0000 100.00
α 0.5533 0.5533 0.5533 0.4206 0.4206 0.4206
Budget with PES
wl 0.1373 0.1193 0.0096 0.2208 0.2089 0.0097
Income 0.1373 0.1193 0.0096 0.2208 0.2089 0.0097
T (X) 0.0928 0.1193 0.0117 0.0739 0.0552 0.0070
P (h) 0.0445 0.0000 < 0 0.1469 0.1537 0.0027
Expenditures 0.1373 0.1193 < 0 0.2208 0.2089 0.0097
Ratios
T/wl 0.6758 1.0000 1.2265 0.3345 0.2641 0.7188
5 Conclusions
Voluntary transactions and negotiation comprise a necessary but not sufficient condition for
designing efficient PES programs. Mechanisms based on the beneficiary-pays rather than
the polluter-pays principle suffer from potential inefficiency generated by budget constraints.
Ecosystems where externalities are potentially high and low levels of natural capital depletion
are socially desirable are not amenable to PES as a solution.
Our calibration shows that Costa Rica’s PSA program offers a relatively low payment for
conservation of the country’s forests. Like Muradian et al. (2010), we argue that in real
world situations economic incentives are not the primary factor leading to the provision
of the ES. However if there are intrinsic motivations then lower voluntary transitions are
necessary to implement efficient allocations and PES is more likely to be a suitable response
to environment mismanagement.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
The planner chooses the (Pareto) efficient allocation, {ht, 1− lt}∞t=1 , ht = AXαt −Xt+1 and 1− lt =
Xt+1
AXαt
, which are functions of the size of the environmental system, by solving the following problem:
max
{Xt+1}∞t=1
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
log (AXαt −Xt+1) + e log
(
Xt+1
AXαt
)]
.
The first order conditions for solving this dynamic problem are given by the following Euler equa-
tion:
Xt+1
AXαt −Xt+1
=
αβAXαt+1
AXαt+1 −Xt+2
+ e(1− αβ), (8)
and the transversality condition for the ecosystem limt→∞ βt−1
Xt+1
AXαt −Xt+1
= 0. The Euler equa-
tion (8) is a two-order differential equation on the ecosystem variable, Xt. It can be reduced to a
first order differential equation by defining zt =
Xt+1
AXαt
. Taking this into account, the equation to
be solved is:
zt
1− zt =
αβ
1− zt+1 + e(1− αβ).
It is straightforward to see that the Pareto-optimal allocation is given by zt+1 = zt = z = (1− l)∗.
Therefore (1−l)∗ = αβ + e(1− αβ)
1 + e(1− αβ) with ∂(1−l)
∗\∂α > 0, ∂(1−l)∗\∂β > 0 and ∂(1−l)∗\∂e > 0.

A.2 Proof Lemma 2
We start by characterizing the solution of the ES user’s problem. The Lagrangian associated with
this maximization problem is
L =
∞∑
t=0
βt {log ht + e log(1− lst ) + λt [wtlst + rtXt − ht − qtXt+1] + µt [AXαt − ht −Xt+1]} ,
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where λt and µt are the Lagrange multipliers. The first order conditions that solve this optimization
problem are, ∀t ≥ 0:
∂L
∂ht
= 0, =⇒ 1
ht
= λt + µt, (9)
∂L
∂lst
= 0, =⇒ e
1− lst
= wtλt, (10)
∂L
∂Xt+1
= 0, =⇒ β {λt+1rt+1 + µt+1αAXα−1t+1 } = qtλt + µt. (11)
Plugging the first order condition of the firms maximization problem, equation (2), into equation
(10) and taking into account that in equilibrium lst = lt = lt, , the following can be written:
e
1− lt
1
(1− qt)AXαt
= λt. (12)
Substituting this into equation (10), gives:
µt =
1
ht
− e
1− lt
1
(1− qt)AXαt
=
1
ht
− e
(1− qt)Xt+1 . (13)
Plugging the first order condition of the firms maximization problem, equation (3), into equation
(11) results in:
βαAXα−1t+1 {λt+1[(1− qt+1)lt+1 + qt+1] + µt+1} = qtλt + µt. (14)
Substituting expressions (12) and (13) into (14), gives:
βαAXα−1t+1
{
e
1− lt+1
1
(1− qt+1)AXαt+1
[(1− qt+1)lt+1 + qt+1] + 1
ct+1
− e
1− lt+1
1
(1− qt+1)AXαt+1
}
=
e
1− lt
qt
(1− qt)AXαt
+
1
ht
− e
1− lt
1
(1− qt)AXαt
.
=⇒ βαAXα−1t+1
{
1
ct+1
− e
AXαt+1
}
=
1
ht
− e
Xt+1
.
Taking into account the constraint of the problem ht = AX
α
t −Xt+1, this expression can be rewritten
after some manipulation as
Xt+1
AXαt −Xt+1
=
αβAXαt+1
AXαt+1 −Xt+2
+ e(1− αβ),
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which is the Euler equation (8) that solves the efficient solution. This proves that the competitive
equilibrium of this economy is Pareto-efficient.
Finally, note that competitive equilibrium implies zero profits. Therefore, taking into account the
production function and first order conditions of the firms maximization problem, equations (2)
and (3), q is given by Πt = AX
α
t [qt (1− α)− αlt (1− qt)] = 0. Therefore qt =
αlt
1− α (1− lt) =
α (1− αβ)
1− α2β + e(1− αβ) (1− α) > 0. 
A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
Note that P (ht) = ht
[
1− qtlt
]
= ht
1− 11− α2β + e(1− αβ) (1− α)
α+ eα(1− αβ)
 . 
A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Note that P (ht) > 0 if
1− α2β + e(1− αβ) (1− α)
α+ eα(1− αβ) > 1 ⇒ e < e =
1− α(1 + αβ)
(2α− 1)(1− αβ) . Consider
the value of α such that for each β, e = 0. This value is equal to αe=0 =
√
4β+1−1
2β . Given that
αβ < 1 then e > 0 if α > 12 . 
A.5 Solving for the Equilibrium
Given e, A, α and β, the equilibrium, (1− l), X h, c, q, w and r are given by the following set of
seven equations.
First, from Lemma 1
(1− l) = αβ + e(1− αβ)
1 + e(1− αβ) .
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Second, from X = Xα − h and h = Xαl
X = (1− l)
1
(1− α) ,
h = (1− l)
α
(1− α) l,
c = h.
Third, from Lemma 2
q =
αl
1− α (1− l) =
α (1− αβ)
1− α2β + e(1− αβ) (1− α) ,
and w and r are computed using equations (2) and (3)
w = (1− q)Xα,
r = αXα−1[(1− q)l + q].
Finally PES, T , and consumption price, pc, are given by
T = rX,
P = h
[
1− q
l
]
.
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